Does a citizen have the right to say that they see a “network” operating within the courts? Can a journalist write about a “mafia-like mechanism” in the justice system? Can a politician call judges “thieves” or “criminals”?

These are no longer merely questions raised on the Internet, in comments under articles or in parliamentary speeches. These words have genuinely ended up before the courts. And it is there that the boundary has been drawn between freedom of expression and liability for defamation, insult or infringement of personal rights.

In short: courts may be criticised harshly. Judgments, delays, errors, professional networks, pathologies, political influence and the inhumanity of the system may all be criticised. Journalistic language, irony, metaphor and even exaggeration may be used.

But without evidence, one may not turn a specific judge, prosecutor or official into a thief, mafioso, bribe-taker or criminal.

The boundary does not run between polite language and harsh language. It runs between an opinion and an allegation of fact made without evidence. Between metaphor and accusation. Between criticism of an institution and attributing disgraceful or criminal conduct to a specific person.

The law: three paths to liability

In such cases, three legal bases most commonly intersect.

The first is the protection of personal rights under Articles 23 and 24 of the Polish Civil Code. These rights include dignity, honour, good name and professional reputation. If someone infringes these rights, a court may order an apology, removal of a publication, payment of compensation or a payment for a social purpose.

The second is Article 212 of the Polish Criminal Code, concerning defamation. It covers accusations against a person, group, institution or organisational unit of conduct or characteristics that may humiliate them in public opinion or expose them to loss of the trust required for their profession.

The third is Article 216 of the Polish Criminal Code, concerning insult. Here, the issue does not always involve a specific factual allegation. Sometimes the offensive and degrading form of a statement itself is enough, where its purpose is not criticism but humiliation.

Above all of this stands Article 54 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which guarantees freedom to express opinions and to obtain and disseminate information. For journalists, the Press Law is also particularly important: the duty of reliability and special diligence, as well as the protection of fair criticism undertaken in the public interest.

That is the theory. The most important lessons, however, emerge from specific cases.

1. “A mafia-like prosecutorial-judicial network”: Strasbourg sided with freedom of expression

The case of journalist Marian Maciejewski is one of the key cases defining the limits of harsh criticism of the justice system.

Maciejewski published an article in which he used, among other expressions, the phrases “thieves in the justice system” and “a mafia-like prosecutorial-judicial network”. He was convicted of defamation in Poland. The case, however, reached the European Court of Human Rights.

In Marian Maciejewski v. Poland, application no. 34447/05, judgment of 13 January 2015, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning freedom of expression.

The Court drew attention to several factors.

First, the case concerned the functioning of the justice system and therefore a matter of significant public interest.

Second, the journalist relied on specific facts, documents and circumstances rather than throwing out an empty slogan detached from any factual material.

Third, the phrase “mafia-like prosecutorial-judicial network” had a strongly evaluative character. It was brutal, but it fell within journalistic commentary concerning the mechanism being described.

If a journalist describes a matter of public importance, has a factual basis and uses the word “mafia” as a metaphor for a network, mechanism or pathology — rather than as a literal accusation that a specific person belongs to a criminal organisation — freedom of expression may protect such language.

The boundary drawn by this case: “mafia” as a journalistic metaphor may be permissible. “Judge X is a member of the mafia” without evidence is an entirely different matter.

2. “Mafia state” — the Supreme Court: harsh metaphors can sometimes be lawful

A similar issue was considered by the Supreme Court in case I CSK 482/18. The judgment was issued on 10 October 2019.

The case concerned the expressions “mafia state” and “this is how a mafia state operates”. Initially, the Regional Court in Warsaw, in a judgment of 15 July 2016, dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeal in Warsaw, in a judgment of 23 March 2018, changed the ruling and ordered an apology. The Supreme Court, however, rejected that approach and ultimately dismissed the appeal of the party seeking protection.

What matters most is how the Supreme Court interpreted the word “mafia”.

The Supreme Court pointed out that in public language the term can also have a metaphorical meaning. It may be used to describe mechanisms of power, networks, abuses, systems of interests or institutional conduct resembling a closed structure of mutual protection.

The Supreme Court did not say: “everyone is allowed to call everyone else the mafia.” Rather, it said that not every harsh metaphor may automatically be treated as an unlawful accusation. The context, facts, public interest and the way the statement would be understood must all be examined.

This is extremely important for journalists. If a text describes real facts, concerns a matter of public interest and the harsh metaphor is an evaluation of a mechanism, then it may fall within the boundaries of press freedom. Even if it offends someone. Even if it is unpleasant. Even if it harms someone’s good name.

The boundary drawn by this case: a strong systemic metaphor may be lawful if it has a factual basis and serves public debate. Unlawfulness returns when the metaphor turns into an unproven allegation of criminal conduct.

3. “Ordinary thieves” — the courts found that the boundary had been crossed

Another case involved proceedings against Stanisław Piotrowicz. It concerned his 2018 statement in which he referred to judges as “ordinary thieves”. The claim was brought by Supreme Court judges Małgorzata Gersdorf and Krzysztof Rączka.

The Regional Court in Warsaw, in its judgment of 2 January 2020, case no. III C 1786/18, found that this statement infringed the judges’ personal rights. The case went through further instances, and on 6 March 2024 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeals. In practice, this meant that the obligation to apologise remained in force.

The word “thief” was found not to be a neutral metaphor. In ordinary usage, it means a person who steals. And theft is a criminal offence. Therefore, if a politician, journalist or citizen says that identifiable judges are “thieves”, the courts found that this goes beyond ordinary criticism of the judiciary. It becomes a disgraceful and criminalising allegation.

The boundary from this case is simple: one may write that a judgment is harmful, unjust, deprives a citizen of property or demonstrates the inhumanity of the system. One may not, without evidence, write that a judge is a thief.

4. The Ministry versus Judge Koska-Janusz

A separate category concerns attacks on judges made by state authorities. Here, the courts draw the line more strictly because a ministry, prosecution service or public authority is not an ordinary commentator. It speaks with the authority of the state.

A good example is the case of Judge Justyna Koska-Janusz.

The Regional Court in Warsaw, in a judgment of 30 March 2018, ordered an apology for a statement issued by the Ministry of Justice concerning the shortening of the judge’s secondment. The Court of Appeal in Warsaw, in its judgment of 1 October 2019, case no. I ACa 433/18, upheld the general direction of the ruling. The Supreme Court, in its judgment of 21 April 2023, case no. II CSKP 310/22, dismissed the cassation appeal of the State Treasury — the Minister of Justice.

In this case, the courts emphasised that the ministry’s statement was not simply a private opinion. It came from a public authority. And a state authority, when responding to press criticism or explaining its personnel decisions, cannot use unreliable insinuations that damage a judge’s good name.

The Supreme Court made it very clear that the state does not enjoy freedom of expression in the same way as a citizen or journalist. An office is not a columnist. A ministry is not a blog. An official state statement must be particularly cautious, factual and based on evidence.

The boundary drawn by this case: a journalist may make evaluations, and a citizen may speak emotionally. A state authority, using the official megaphone of government, may not publicly stigmatise a judge through unreliable claims.

5. Łączewski — a press conference is not a court trial

This can be seen even more clearly in the case of former judge Wojciech Cezary Łączewski.

On 10 June 2026, the website of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Kraków published an apology resulting from a settlement concluded in case no. III C 1505/19 before the Regional Court in Warsaw. The apology concerned statements made by Prosecutor General Zbigniew Ziobro during press conferences held on 5 April 2019, 17 September 2019 and 11 October 2019.

The apology stated that the statements questioned Wojciech Cezary Łączewski’s professional competence and credibility as a judge, infringed the presumption of innocence and violated his personal rights: dignity, honour and good name.

This is a particularly important example. If a representative of the state appears at a press conference and speaks about a person in a way that sounds like a conviction in the eyes of the public, this may violate not only that person’s good name. It may also violate the presumption of innocence.

The boundary drawn by this case: the state cannot stage a media trial instead of a court trial.

What is allowed?

It is permissible to write that a judgment is unjust, absurd, detached from reality or socially harmful.

It is permissible to write that a court failed to address key evidence, ignored an important argument, handled a case with excessive delay or explained its judgment in an incomprehensible way.

It is permissible to ask whether a case involves a conflict of interest, a network of personal connections, professional solidarity or a mechanism of mutual protection.

It is permissible to use strong metaphors such as “network”, “closed circle”, “state within a state”, and sometimes even “mafia-like mechanism” where the article presents facts, documents and context, and the reader understands that the phrase is an assessment of a system rather than a literal accusation against a specific individual.

It is permissible to quote parties to proceedings, lawyers, case files, complaints, notifications and procedural submissions, but it must always be made clear: who is making the claim, who established a fact, who is making an allegation, who denies it and what follows from the documents.

It is permissible to write harshly. It is not permissible to write unreliably.